Towards the objective of keeping al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at bay on a ‘light’ military footprint, the US has launched a total of 105 drone/airs-strikes in Yemen since 2009. Within that period, anywhere from 732-942 people were pulverized by American munitions—623-808 of them confirmed militants, between 78-84 civilians, and 31-50 whose identities are “unknown.”
Prima facie, and collateral damage notwithstanding, the US’s surgical campaign can be graded a resounding success; it’s liquidated terrorist leadership and expertise not easily replaced, undercut AQAP’s “ability to communicate and to train new recruits,” and has overall made their lives a perilous game of Whac-A-Mole.
The above scorecard is certainly impressive—but it’s also superficial. AQAP has seen its ranks more than triple from roughly 300 fighters in 2009 to over 1000 by the end of 2012. Incidentally—or not, the former was the year in which civilian casualties reportedly neared those of militants (41:54) while the latter saw a high-water mark of 56 attacks (incurring between a min-max of 17-36 civilians respectively.) One may dispute any causality—perhaps there are variables unaccounted for. However, what is sure is that the combination of bereavement with the shunning of popular grievances is a recipe propitious for terrorist recruitment. As one local journalist put it: “Every time drones attack, there is an increase in sympathy for AQ. Say you hit four? Well, you’ve just recruited dozens.”
Indeed, hellfire missiles are good at killing terrorists—but that’s all. Such a notion is (or at least should be), by now, boilerplate. Nonetheless, it its continuously ignored by those steering US counter-terrorism policy.
Producing Antibodies–Not ‘Body Bags’
Populaces can be understood as biological host cells, with the terrorists the invading virus, and resentment (i.e. lack of governance, infrastructure, political voice) denoting a feeble immune system. As one would expect, any strategy, which zaps the virus without strengthening the immune system does nothing to stem pathogenic regeneration; it merely ‘mows the lawn.’
In the Yemenite village of Jism, the immune system is weak: utilities such as running water, electricity, schools, health clinics, and paves roads are “non-existent,” while the ruling regime “has done nothing” to help. “We gave this man the legitimacy to rule over us,” bemoans one local, “but he doesn’t care that people are hungry, he doesn’t care that his people are treated badly in neighboring countries, he doesn’t care that his people are being hit with US drones.”
Naturally, when the only actor that gives a damn (or at least pretends to) is a band of heavily armed religious Utopians ‘beggars can’t be choosers.’
For some peasants in Yemen’s backcountry, the equation is simple: AQAP proffers food, water, and electricity—the US and Yemen delivers security raids and bombs. Of course, this isn’t entirely accurate; the US has indeed engaged in humanitarian projects. But when people you know are ‘accidentally’ blown to pieces, memory loss is understandable. Moreover, such initiatives are typically a garnish for where the big bucks usually go: Yemen’s corrupt military and US counter-terrorism operations.
On December 12, 2013, what was initially perceived as yet another US tactical victory—the elimination of an AQAP operational mastermind in a drone strike—soon transformed into an AQ propaganda triumph when a convoy of wedding guests was cut down by hellfire missiles. All in all, between 12 and 17 people perished. And while the US maintains AQAP militants were among the dead—this is of little solace to those whose friends and families were charred to pieces. Euphemisms of ‘collateral damage’ may salve a conscience, but they do little to invalidate (and rather validate) AQAP’s self-portrait as ‘guardian’ of the downtrodden.
The US may no longer be pushing the buttons directly, but the same misbegotten strategy is manifest today in the bridling Iraqi province of Anbar. There, like in Yemen, the US is once again trying to ‘hellfire’ away a deeply rooted problem. To better understand how feckless this is, an etiological recap of Sunni discontent is forthcoming.
Grievances and the Pathology of Rage
Iraq’s minority (35% of the population) Sunni demographic has a lot to be angry about. Having presided over the country for decades while enjoying the perquisites (i.e. Jobs, Military positions) of gentry, the 2003 US invasion heralded their stratospheric fall from grace. With the countenance of the US and the muscle of its guns, Iraq’s long oppressed Shiite majority had a virtual carte blanche to stick it to the Ba’ath aristocracy and settle a litany of scores decades overdue.
And stick it they did. The de-Ba’athification program—a US approved measure to purge Iraq’s public sector and military of Ba’ath influence (mostly Sunnis affiliated with the previous regime)—was just the beginning of a series of revanchist policies bent on turning the hierarchical tables. In short order, some 600,000-900,000 Sunnis (500,000-800,000 soldiers and 100,000 civil servants) were shunted to the unemployment line; the majority of whom had “extensive weapons training and access to military weapons.” There didn’t appear to be any room for them in the new Iraq–a perception that stokes the flames of sectarian violence to this day.
Given that Sunnis had widely boycotted the 2005 parliamentary elections, their participation in the constitutional referendum later that year was key for its legitimacy. As such, to assuage their fears of a Shiite governmental stranglehold, the document was formulated ecumenically with an emphasis on ‘power sharing’. Accordingly, executive functions would be distributed along Iraq’s three main ethnic lines, so as to prevent “a return to dictatorial autocratic power” by any sole figure and strictly limit the power of the central government. Further, owing to Iraqi’s demographic geography (i.e. a predominantly Shiite south, Sunni center, Kurdish north), provincial governments were afforded relative autonomy and empowered to regulate the appropriation of resources, wealth, and the provision of local security.
In the end, voter turnout was high (63%) and the constitution was approved by 78.59% of the electorate. However despite the constitution’s pluralistic overtones, it received weak support among Sunnis and was overwhelmingly rejected in several of their major strongholds (in al Anbar, for instance, 96.9% voted in opposition). But considering the AQ death threats they faced, the Sunni participation in the constitutional referendum was encouraging. Still, the mistrust towards their Shiite countrymen was palpable and would only fester during the upheaval of the years ahead.
With its prodigious campaign of suicide bombings and execution squads targeting Shiites, Iraq’s AQ antagonists were determined to add fuel to the fire and tear the country apart. They came pretty close. Between 2006-07, tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians would perish in confessional violence, as inter-communal enmity appeared to cross the point of no return.
So long as Sunnis and Shiites were killing each other, any political progress was all but a chimera. This realization was the basis for the US ‘Troop Surge’ strategy, in which 20,000 additional American soldiers were deployed to help stabilize areas careening out of control; the political epicenter of Baghdad chief among them.
Whether the ‘Surge’ single-handedly pared the rate of violence or was merely a supplementary factor to other elements (i.e. ‘The Awakening Movement’) is moot. What’s important is that the presence of US troops on the ground as a checking force against Shiite (who predominated Iraq’s Internal Security forces) excesses helped mollify Sunni insecurities. Sure, trust was tenuous and grievances lingered, but Sunnis were at least emboldened enough to work within the political framework and make a strong showing in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
Maliki’s Power Trip
Regrettably, any measure of Sunni optimism unraveled when, just months before the election, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) disqualified 500 candidates over their alleged Ba’athist affiliations. That Shiites were again up to their old tricks was an assessment that only gained steam when the non-sectarian and Sunni-favored al-Iraqiyya party won the election (albeit by a hair) but—as an outcome of yet another contentious court ruling—was denied the right to form the new government. The verdict, issued by a judge perceived as nested in Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s pocket, was a stark violation of the country’s constitution. The knowledge that Iran had pulled every string it could to prevent an outcome “that would put Allawi and his Sunni coalition in control of the government” only added insult to injury.
His electoral victory embroiled in controversy, Maliki proceeded under a patina of inclusivity, appointing (albeit belatedly) a Sunni Defense Minister and even allowing al-Iraqiyya party head, Ayad Allawi, to chair the National Security Council. However, it didn’t take long for him to shed the disguise.
In December 2011, just two days after the last US troops crossed into Kuwait, Maliki sent his strongmen to arrest Sunni Vice President Tariq al Hashemi on putatively trumped up ‘coup’ charges. His bodyguards tortured into confessing, al Hashemi absconded to Turkey where he’s stayed ever since.
For good measure, just two weeks prior to a visit in Washington that very same month, Maliki ordered the detention of 1,000 alleged Ba’athists on what was widely considered “disputed intelligence.”
Maliki’s bravado was just getting started. Almost exactly one year following the attempted arrest of VP Hashemi, Maliki’s power play continued when he tried to apprehend his popular Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al Issawi on terrorist links the Americans had already concluded were baseless in a 2010 investigation.
The inflection points above abut a larger Maliki-led drive to consolidate Shiite power to forestall any possibility, however remote it is, of a Sunni resurgence. Indeed, Maliki is convinced of Sunni conspiracies “to overthrow him” and his inner circle only “feeds these fears.” As such, Maliki has brazenly worked to bring major organs of government directly under his orbit; transferring special security units from the Defense Ministry to his own purview; commandeering the appointment of high-ranking military officials; and fusing the police and army into one office under a general of his choice–thereby usurping control over all security functions.
On top of ‘coup-proofing’ the military, these maneuvers have allowed Shia dominated security forces, masquerading as militias, to maintain “secret prisons” and conduct kidnappings and targeting killing “with apparent impunity.” Indeed, as one investigator noted: “The Iraqi security forces appear to be the ultimate Shia militia, corralling Sunnis into Ghettoized neighborhoods, where they are subject to repressive policing and economic isolation.”
Quite flagrantly, Maliki’s imperiousness has breached what few checks and balances were left. Both the Election and Integrity Commissions, together the Central Bank, have been removed from parliamentary oversight and placed under the supervision of his own cabinet. Under his thrall, it didn’t take long for Maliki to throw his weight around, as he moved to arrest the Central Bank Governor, purge the Election Commission while jailing its former commissioner, and staff the judiciary with those amenable to his will.
Brought to a Boil
Long watching helplessly as their influence was carted off, the aforementioned 2012 arrest attempt of Finance Minister al-Issawi was the last straw. In the coming days, weeks and months that followed, tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets across the Sunni heartland to vent their rage. Peaceful at the outset, the demonstrations soon turned deadly. In January, a total of 7 protestors were gunned down and 78 more wounded when Iraqi Army troops opened fire on demonstrations in Mosul and Anbar province. Still, despite the several more that joined the casualty count in proceeding months—the public response was relatively subdued. In April, that would change.
Faced with protests in Hawija, a village near the northern city of Kirkuk, Maliki sent his troops in to clean house; dozens of demonstrators would be mowed down while hundreds more were wounded in the operation. As news of the bloodshed spread, leaders of some of Iraq’s most powerful Sunni tribes issued calls for open revolt. Pandemonium set in as vengeful tribesman and local militia joined the fray to settle the scores. By the end of the month skirmishes that had originated in Hawija, including suicide bombings, mortar attacks and kidnappings, soon engulfed towns across central and northern Iraq.
Though he had opened up the Pandora’s box, Maliki was not to be deterred. In September, he announced the creation of a revamped Baghdad security force: a conglomerate of Shiite militias, most of who were moonlighting as proxies for the Iranian Quds Force. Given that Sunnis have long suspected an Iranian plot to gobble up the country (a narrative featured prominently in Islamic State of Iraq & Syria [ISIS] recruitment materials) the flourish did little to palliate their concerns.
Then, in December, for an astonishing 3rd year in a row, Maliki lit the proverbial fuse once again; arresting popular Anbar parliamentarian Ahmed al-Alwani on ‘terrorism charges’ and dispatching his strongmen to suppress a 12-month sit-in at a protest camp in Ramadi–one he charged was “an AQ headquarters.”
[Jihadists Enter Stage Right]: “Did someone say grievance?”
No longer was Al-Anbar going to take Maliki’s strong-arming lying down. After months of ‘Counter Terror’ operations, punctuated by mass arrests and sporadic shelling (which forced 500,000 people to flee), it had seen enough. Those sent in terminate the Ramadi protests would receive this message through relentless hails of gunfire. Clashes went on frenetically for days as police stations were swiftly overrun. So intense was the fighting that the army had to sic its mechanized forces, including American M1 Abrams tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers, on the raging militants. Fearing an all out bloodbath—and lacking armored helicopters—the army pulled back, ceding control in both Ramadi and Fallujah to local tribal councils and eventually (though now largely in Fallujah) the ISI.
Unfortunately, we’ve seen this paradigm before: protestors with genuine grievances are branded as ‘terrorists’ and told to take a hike; protestors stand their ground and are greeted with bullets; the situation descends into anarchy and ‘yadda yadda yadda’–AQ mystically appears. There are nuances of course, and the comparison isn’t entirely congruous. But what transpired in Ramadi and, soon after, Fallujah, is uncannily similar to other ‘notable insurrections’ in recent memory.
Neither the presence of the ISIS nor its popular appeal should be overstated. The group is just one of many fighting for control in Anbar (for example, ISIS fighters are estimated to make up only about 1/5 to 1/3 of insurgents in Fallujah). Moreover, many tribesmen haven’t forgotten the sheer brutality meted out by the group in the ‘pre-Awakening’ days.
Yet its embrace could very well grow. Apart from a few sops (salary increases for Awakening militants, prisoner releases, etc.) Maliki has shown little willingness to address the Anbar’s core grievances. And with the Sunni attempt to overthrow an Iranian protectorate (aka the Assad regime) just next-door, he’s unlikely to do so. Alas, the Sunni rage will crescendo. While the ISIS, flush with weapons, money, and offering a contextual frame that appeals to despondence, could snowball.
It’s this very desperation that’s bewitched ex-General Mustafa Al Mashhadani and at least a hundred more former Iraqi army officers, many of who have joined the ranks of ISIS and other Islamic groups after the December flare-up. Though largely secular, many are victims of the ‘De-Ba’athication’ campaign. They may “refuse AQ’s ideology” but they miss their jobs and “hate the government” even more. The end result? “Today, I am absolutely with AQ [ISIS],” says Mashhadani.
Parliamentary elections are little more than a month away, but Sunnis have little hope. Like before, Maliki’s rubberstamp judiciary has already barred several of the government’s more outspoken critics from running. As the International Crisis Group reports, many Sunnis have thus concluded, “that their only realistic option is a violent conflict increasingly framed in confessional terms.”
Conclusion: Our Strategic Victory…….For Lockheed Martin and Jihadists
At last, we arrive to the punch line. While perturbed by the ISIS renaissance in Anbar, particularly given the heavy casualties it sustained over the years in uprooting its foothold, US troops aren’t going anywhere (obviously). Instead, the Obama administration has devolved the dirty work to Maliki, agreeing to supply his army with 24 state-of-the-art AH64E Apache attack helicopters and 575 Hellfire missiles (75 of which were delivered in December) to help them do the job. Indeed, rather than browbeat Maliki into tackling the root of the problem—Sunni marginalization—the US took one from its Yemen ‘playbook’ and is again throwing weapons at it.
After leaving our Sunni friends in the lurch following an unceremonious departure, is this the message the US really wants to send? It’s bad enough Sunnis in Syria feel we’ve left them to the wolves (a narrative AQ’s local affiliate was quick to play up). What more when ‘Made in the USA’ stamped munitions are rending them to pieces—if only ‘errantly’—in the villages of Anbar?
I realize that ‘tackling’ grievances, especially those that are corollaries of immemorial animosities, isn’t that simple. In contrast, blowing ‘stuff’ up is easier, and its results/successes—more readily discernable (and thus more ‘ballyhooable’). But if we’re serious about combatting terrorism, we need to stop going with what’s easy and go with what works—however arduous and long it takes.
Information Age Jihad 